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I. INTRODUCTION
In an ever-growing democratic society, it is every citizen's right
and duty to participate in the democratic process. It is their decision to
be an active participant, even if it is simply to vote. However, when
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does this right begin? What is the magic day on which a citizen's voice
begins to matter? Does it start only when a citizen is legally old
enough to vote? High school students across the country have refused
to wait until their eighteenth birthday to participate in the democratic
process. These students strive to find appropriate avenues to voice
their opinions.
In December of 2005, Congressman Sensenbrenner of Wiscon-
sin submitted the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal
Immigration Control Act of 2005.1 The bill was designed to
"strengthen enforcement of the immigration laws, to enhance border
security, and for other purposes."'2 As support grew for the bill, the
stage was set for millions of Americans and American immigrants to
rise up in protest of the bill, which would raise penalties for illegal
immigration and classify illegal aliens, as well as anyone who helps
them enter or remain in the United States, as felons.3 These protests
arose all over the country in the spring of 2006. This paper focuses on
student protestors from high schools and middle schools who walked
out or skipped classes in order to participate in the marches and
protests.
In Los Angeles County alone, roughly 11,000 students either
left class or skipped school to protest the Border Protection, Antiterror-
ism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act. 4 In response, the Los
Angeles County Superintendent of Schools stated that the school dis-
trict's highest priority was to ensure that these students were
attending classes and not skipping school.5 The school district then
classified any student who was caught leaving campus or who was ab-
sent from school during the protests as truant.
6
As students continued to protest the proposed immigration
laws, the state responded. At Westchester High School in Los Angeles,
at 9:25 am on March 29, 2006, a number of students got up and walked
1. H.R. REP. No. 109-345(I) (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 11.
4. Police to Crack Down on Student Walkouts: Truants Could Face Fines, Community
Service, KNBC.coM, http://www.knbc.com/education/8312992/detail.html (last visited Nov.
27, 2007) [hereinafter Student Walkouts]; see also Sherry Saavedra, Legality of Protest
Penalties Disputed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 22, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.
signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060422/news-7m22suspend.html; Laura Hensley, Hearne
Students Join in Protests, THE BRYAN-C. STATION EAGLE, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http:ll
209.189.226.235/stories/040406/schools_20060404007.php; Jacob Adelman, No Student
Walkouts Reported in L.A. After Crackdown on Truancy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 30, 2006,
available at http://www.infoshop.org/inews/article.php?story=20060330145711442.




out of classes to protest.7 Roughly 100 students were cited with tru-
ancy, while other students were rounded-up, placed on buses, and
shipped back to school only thirty-five minutes after leaving.8 While
the protests were peaceful overall, law enforcement officials stated
that they were "tired of student protests."9 These law enforcement offi-
cials claimed that the protests were putting a strain on their ability to
respond to emergencies. 10 Moreover, Los Angeles students were not
alone in being issued truancy violations." Students from all areas of
California and other Southwestern states were also faced with police
intervention when attempting to protest by walking out of school. 12
These students, who were issued truancy violations, now face blem-
ished high school records, criminal records, fines ranging from $200-
$500, and community service.13
This paper addresses the events surrounding the student immi-
gration protests in spring of 2006. Specifically, this paper concentrates
on the validity of the state's issuance of truancy violations and the sub-
sequent school discipline. The history of truancy and compulsory
education laws is discussed first, followed by an analysis of whether
these laws are facially unconstitutional because of overbreadth. These
state statutes will then be examined under the O'Brien test.' 4 Finally,
this paper will address the schools' response under the Tinker'5
analysis.
II. THE HISTORY OF TRUANCY AND COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS
Prior to engaging in an analysis of whether these truancy and
compulsory education laws are unconstitutional, it is first important to
7. Police Enforce Truancy Laws To Quell School Student Walkouts: Protesting High
School Students Face Discipline (Mar. 29, 2006) available at http://www.knbc.com/news/834
0584/detail.html [hereinafter Police Enforce Truancy Laws].
8. Id.
9. Student Walkouts, supra note 4 (stating that the marches were mostly peaceful but
a few students were arrested for things other then truancy, such as assault).
10. Student Walkouts, supra note 4.
11. See Saavedra, supra note 4; Hensley, supra note 4.
12. See Saavedra, supra note 4; Hensley, supra note 4.
13. Student Walkouts, supra note 4; Hensley, supra note 4; Adelman, supra note 4;
Police Enforce Truancy, supra note 7.
14. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (determining whether the restriction
on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further an important or
substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding it
unconstitutional to deny students their freedom to express an opinion, at school, absent a
showing that the students engaged in conduct that would materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school).
2007
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 2:1:185
discuss a brief history and an understanding of these laws. Compul-
sory education laws ensure that students attend school, regardless of
the manner in which these students acquire their education, up to a
certain age. 16 These laws apply only to the time when the student is
supposed to be in school and up to the age as set forth in the specific
statutes. 17 Generally, the purpose of compulsory education laws is to
ensure that children attend school.' However, the specific state inter-
ests as to why these students need to be attending school are further
explained in subsequent paragraphs. Lastly, truancy laws are the ve-
hicle by which the above compulsory education laws are enforced.' 9
Compulsory education laws and truancy violations are enforced
in a variety of ways, including civil court proceedings or even criminal
proceedings. 20 Generally, however, when a youth is picked up by a tru-
ant officer, the offense is not treated as criminal and the emphasis is
not on punishment but rather the correction of the behavior. 21 As
such, a truant officer typically returns the youth to school or to a
parent.2
2
Truancy laws or compulsory attendance laws have been enacted
in all states. 23 The earliest of these laws was enacted in Massachu-
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (7th ed. 1999) (defining compulsory-attendance
laws); 3 J. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW, § 8.03 (2006) [hereinafter EDUCATION LAW]; 78A C.J.S.
Schools & School Districts §732 (1995).
17. See 78A C.J.S. Schools & School Districts at § 736.
18. Id. at § 732.
19. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (7th ed. 1999); see also 78A C.J.S. Schools &
School Districts at § 740.
20. 78A C.J.S. Schools & School Districts at § 732.
21. In re James D., 741 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1987).
22. Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1513 (7th ed. 1999); see also 78A C.J.S. Schools &
School Districts at § 741 (truant officer is an official who is responsible for enforcing truancy
laws; the officer is typically a public official created through the specific state statute).
23. ALA. CODE § 16-28-1 et seq.; ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 et seq.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-802; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 et seq.; COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 22-33-104; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-184; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702 et. seq.; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-202 et seq.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.21 et seq.; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1;
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 302A-1132; IDAHO CODE § 33-202 et seq.; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 et
seq.; IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-2-6 et seq.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 et seq.; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72-1111; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 et. seq.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.221; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20(A), § 5001(A); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-301; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 76. § 1
et seq.; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1561; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101; Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-
13-91; Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031 et seq.; MOT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 et seq.; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 79-201 et seq.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.040 et seq.; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1 et seq.; N.J.
STAT. A NN. § 8A: 38-25 et seq.; N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-1-2.1 et seq.; N.Y. EDUC. CODE LAW
§ 3201 et seq.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378; N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-20.01 et seq.; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3321.01 et seq.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 70, § 10-105; OR. REV. STAT. § 339.005 et
seq.; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1326 et seq.; R.I. GEN LAWS § 16-19-1 et seq.; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 59-65-10 et seq.; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-27-1 et. seq.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-2001
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setts in 1852.24 Since then, all states have adopted truancy or
compulsory educational laws for three reasons. The first of these pol-
icy reasons was based on a social concern about child labor and
employment opportunities. 25 The second policy consideration for com-
pulsory education laws is based on the importance of "training school
children in good citizenship, patriotism, and loyalty to the state and
the nation . -26 The last of the legislative reasons focuses on a desire
to vagrancy, juvenile crime, and other, and reducing daytime crime.27
While social concern regarding child labor laws may not continue to be
the central point of legislative concern, the two policies still carry a lot
of weight in why states implement and enforce truancy laws. The sec-
ond and third legislative concerns are discussed in the following
paragraphs to explain why states have a high incentive to compel stu-
dents to attend school.
A. Truancy Laws to Promote Social and Individual Welfare
State legislatures have long justified truancy and compulsory
educational laws by citing the social interest in the protection and edu-
cation of children, thereby ensuring that there is a "continuance upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full matur[e] cit-
izens .... 28 This philosophy serves is importance to both the
individual and society.29 Thomas Jefferson stated that education is
necessary to prepare citizens to work and participate in society and in
the American political system. 30 It is this participation that ensures
that our political system will flourish and "preserve freedom and inde-
pendence ''3 1 so that every child will receive the schooling that is needed
to "function in the adult world. ' 32 Furthermore, Thomas Jefferson
claimed that education would prepare the individual to be self-reliant
et seq.; TEX. CODE ANN. § 25.085 et seq.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 et seq.; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 et seq.; VA. CODE § 22.1-245, et seq.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.225.010; W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15; Wyo. STAT. § 21-4-101 et
seq.
24. EDUCATION LAW, supra note 16 at §8.03(2).
25. Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 227-28 (1972).
26. EDUCATION LAW, supra note 16 at § 8.03(2).
27. Id.
28. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
29. See In re James D., 741 P.2d at 166-67.
30. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
31. Id.
32. In re Julio R., 492 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (1985).
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and self-sufficient. 33 Courts have echoed this Jeffersonian belief in
stating that state truancy and compulsory education laws "prepare cit-
izens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system, which is an indispensable prerequisite to the preservation of
our democratic republic."34 These laws are those which "[t/he Ameri-
can people have always regarded . .. of supreme importance which
should be diligently promoted."35 Therefore, state legislatures have
been given great deference in the implementation and enforcement of
state compulsory attendance and educational laws.
B. Truancy Laws to Discourage Vagrancy and Juvenile Crime
Truancy and compulsory educational laws have also functioned
to combat juvenile crime. Truancy is a gateway crime.3 6 Truant be-
havior at a young age leads to higher drop-out rates and criminal
activity.37 In two studies, it was shown that when students are absent
from school and detained, roughly fifty-percent of those detained tested
positive for drug use.3 8 Generally, there is a direct correlation between
truancy and substance abuse, gang activity, and involvement in other
criminal activity such as auto theft, burglary, and vandalism.
39
Statistics have shown that truancy is one of the "best indicators
of academic failure, suspension, expulsion, and delinquency."40 These
problems do not end in adolescence, but continue to escalate into adult-
hood, including problems such as mental health problems, adult
crimes, violence, lower salaries, and poverty. 41 In New York, the use of
police to combat truancy is deemed a valid police power of the state.
42
This was especially seen as a result of the economic and social impact
33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; see also Michigan v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Mich.
1993).
34. Michigan v. Bennent, 501 N.W.2d 106, 124 (Mich. 1993).
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
36. Tad A. Delvin, Education: Truant Students, 27 PAC. L.J. 703, 704 (1996); see also
Truancy: First Step to a Lifetime of Problems, U.S. Dept. of Justice/Juvenile Justice
Bulletin, Oct. 1996, at 1 [hereinafter First Step to a Lifetime of Problems].
37. Delvin, supra note 36, at 704; Dragan Milovanovic, Adolescent Subcultures and
Deliquency, 76 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 794, 796 (1985).
38. First Step to a Lifetime of Problems, supra note 36, at 1.
39. Truancy Reduction: Keeping Students in School, (U.S. Dept. of Justice/Juvenile
Justice Bulletin), Sep. 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Keeping Students in School].
40. Lorenzo A. Trujillo, School Truancy: A Case Study of a Successful Truancy
Reduction Model in Public Schools, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 69, 70 (2006); Keeping
Students in School, supra note 39, at 1.
41. Keeping Students in School, supra note 39, at 1.
42. In re Julio R., 492 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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that truancy had in New York City.43 In New York City, more than
one-third of the city's youth were consistently absent from school.
44
Most of these students ended-up becoming unemployable, which led to
higher crime rates.45 Similar statistics are found around the coun-
try.46 In response, police have conducted truancy sweeps that have
produced dramatic drops in daytime crime rates.47 As a result, it is
clear that the need for truancy laws to combat juvenile delinquency is
still alive today.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION AND ITS LIMITS
Determining whether the state is justified in the issuance of
truancy violations and the upholding of compulsory education laws
against young adults, in lieu of their rights to free speech, requires in-
depth analysis of a variety of constitutional issues. First, the compul-
sory education and truancy laws are analyzed to determine if the
statutes are overbroad and therefore facially unconstitutional. This is
followed by an analysis of the statutes under O'Brien in determining
whether the statutes are content-neutral in light of the events in
spring 2006. It becomes apparent through the application of these
tests that the state is justified in enforcing compulsory education laws
and truancy violations against these young adults despite their right to
free speech.
A. The Overbreadth of Compulsory Education
and Truancy Violations
The doctrine of overbreadth is concerned with the construction
and application of a statute.48 A statute, on its face, may appear to be
clear in regulating one type of unprotected speech but at the same time
sweeps too broadly and regulates protected speech as well.49 The Su-
preme Court has held that if this occurs the statue is overbroad. Due




46. Trujillo, supra note 40, at 73-74.
47. Id.
48. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see also Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 847 (1970) (overbreadth doctrine
seeks to mend the injuries an individual suffers when a statute is over inclusive, as drafted).
49. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
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is applicable to the litigant raising the claim. 50 Therefore, even if the
students, in the spring of 2006, may have been legitimately subject to
the compulsory education laws and truancy laws, the students could
still raise the constitutional claim of overbreadth. If that claim
prevails, the acts of the state in the issuance of truancy violations will
be unconstitutional. However, it should be mentioned that the Su-
preme Court has ruled that declaring a statute unconstitutional
because of overbreadth is "manifestly strong medicine" and should be
used only in limited circumstances. 51 As such, the students will be
faced with a difficult battle in trying to prove the statute is overbroad
and unconstitutional on its face.
In determining whether the compulsory education and truancy
laws are overbroad, it is important to look at the general rules that the
Supreme Court has created in deciding whether a statute or regulation
is overbroad. 52 In a case like this, "where conduct and not merely
speech is involved, [the court believed] that the overbreadth of a stat-
ute must not only be real, but [must be] substantial as well, [and]
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."5 3 As such,
a statute that deals with both content and speech is given a less rigor-
ous standard of scrutiny when addressing the issue of overbreadth.
54
In one case where conduct was mixed with speech, the Supreme Court
held that statutes that limited political expression of public employees
were not overbroad even if it may have created a chilling effect on
speech.55 The Court reasoned that there were adequate state interests
in prohibiting state employees from campaigning, like statutes regulat-
ing peace in the community, and therefore the statute was not
substantially overbroad because the state interests were compelling.
56
Therefore, a statute will not be determined to be facially invalid if
there are situations where there are valid legitimate state interests
that are not substantially overbroad.
The students in the events that occurred in the spring of 2006
were expressing their First Amendment rights by mixing both speech
and conduct. As such, a lesser degree of scrutiny will be applied in
determining whether the compulsory education and truancy laws are
unconstitutional. In determining whether these statutes are unconsti-
50. Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 2-3 (1973).
51. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
52. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 413 (2000).






tutional, the state interests need to be determined. Here, the state has
important reasons to enforce truancy and compulsory education
laws.57 The reasons for the creation of truancy and compulsory educa-
tion laws are as significant, if not more significant, as the statute that
was determined not to be overbroad in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. In fact,
these statutes seem to be more akin to that of laws that regulate the
peace of the community. As a result, the statutes and regulations will
be upheld as long as they are not substantially overbroad. In this in-
stance, it cannot be said that the truancy and compulsory education
laws are substantially overbroad, because they do not prohibit or regu-
late substantially more speech than necessary to serve the state's
legitimate interests. As mentioned, these laws only apply when school
is in session and only affect the conduct of these students while in
school. The regulations in no way affect what the students may do in
their free time outside of school, nor do they prevent them from bring-
ing up certain issues while they are not in school. Additionally, these
compulsory education and truancy laws only compel students to attend
school up to a certain age, not indefinitely. Consequently, even if there
is a marginal overreaching by the legislature in creating these stat-
utes, that overreaching is not substantial enough to invalidate these
statutes on their face. State truancy laws and compulsory education
laws are therefore not unconstitutional due to overbreadth.
B. Content-Neutral Regulations: Truancy and the
First Amendment Under O'Brien
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that the state does not
have a right to impose mandatory education on children when the im-
position interferes with other fundamental rights.58 Political speech is
one such fundamental right. 59 "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech .... ."60 However, the right to free speech is
not absolute. 61 The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions made on
speech.6 2 However, deciding whether the restriction is based on the
content of the speech is important in analyzing whether the restriction
57. See supra Part II.
58. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; see also DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 139; 68 AM. JUR. 2D
SCHOOLS § 253 (2000).
59. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding
first amendment protection applied to state's legislation).
61. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
62. Id. ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
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on speech is constitutional. This is significant because the standard of
review that is applied varies based on whether the regulation is based
on the content of the speech or whether the restriction is placed on
speech regardless of its content, thus making it content-neutral. 63
Therefore, the first-step in analyzing a restriction placed on speech is
to determine whether the restriction is based on the content of the
speech or whether the restriction is placed on speech regardless of its
content, thus content-based or content-neutral.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., the Supreme
Court held that when a regulation is content-based, a strict level of
judicial scrutiny needs to be applied as opposed to when the regulation
is content-neutral, which receives an intermediate level of judicial
scrutiny.64 This distinction is made because with content-based regu-
lations there is a greater risk that the legislature may have improper
intentions and are attempting to suppress ideas of speech that are not
popular.65 This is in contrast with content-neutral regulations which
pose substantially less risk. The motivations for these laws are com-
pletely unrelated to the speech. 66 The determination of whether a
statute or regulation is content-based or content-neutral, however, is
not always easy. The focus rests on "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement
with the message it conveys." 67 Courts will look to see if one type of
speech is favored over another type of speech. 68 For example, regula-
tions that have been considered content-based are ones that allowed
picketing in front of a foreign embassy if the content was based on that
country's foreign policy,69 or restricting citizens' First Amendment
voices to non-political speech around polling places. 70 This is com-
pared to a content-neutral regulation that controlled posting signs on
any type of public property regardless of its message. 71 Therefore, reg-
ulations that place burdens and benefits without reference to speech
are usually content-neutral. 72
63. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
64. Id. at 641.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 642 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
68. Id. at 643.
69. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988).
70. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (upholding a content-based restriction
on First Amendment speech).
71. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
72. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643.
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While truancy laws have restricted the First Amendment rights
of these students, it is apparent that the statutes were created only to
keep students in school, with no reference to speech at all. It is appar-
ent that these truancy and compulsory education laws are not selective
by allowing the protesting of one issue but prohibiting the protesting of
another issue. As such, the compulsory education and truancy laws
are content-neutral statutes; an intermediate level of scrutiny is
appropriate.
In analyzing content-neutral regulations that impact expres-
sion, the Supreme Court has adopted a three-prong test in the United
States v. O'Brien.73 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court could not accept
the proposition that whenever people engaged in conduct that they in-
tended to express an idea that they were always protected by the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech. 74 Rather, the Court stated that when
there was an action commingled with speech, the government could
have a sufficiently important interest in regulating that non-speech el-
ement of the conduct. 75 Therefore, the Court held that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of government; if it (1) furthers an important
or substantial government interest; (2) if the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and (3) the restriction is
no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that [state]
interest.
76
O'Brien is the appropriate analysis here because by walking out
of classes and not attending school, the students, like in O'Brien, were
expressing themselves through an act.77 The act was the students' ab-
sence from school and the marching. The students showed how
important the issue was to a number of students and how many people
the immigration reform could affect.78 Additionally, the protesting stu-
dents cost the school districts considerable amount of money in which
the school districts received for the attendance of each student.
79
Therefore, in analyzing truancy and compulsory education laws and its
affects on the restriction of free speech, the analysis in O'Brien must be
applied.




77. Id. (O'Brien's action of burning a draft card was considered symbolic speech).
78. Hensley, supra note 4.
79. Police to Enforce Truancy, supra note 7 (Los Angeles Unified School District
receives $28 per student per day who attend school).
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Truancy and compulsory education laws encompass state inter-
ests, as demonstrated above.80 The state's interest in providing public
schools and ensuring that students become educated is truly at the
"apex of the function of the state."8 ' However, while the above inter-
ests are considered the "apex," these state interests have been fought
in court and have been determined not to be absolute.8 2 These cases
have focused on the state's right to enforce compulsory educational
laws against the First Amendment freedom of religion.8 3 The courts
held that when the First Amendment right of religion is in conflict with
state compulsory education, the states' interest may yield to that of
religion.8 4 While the First Amendment has taken priority over state
truancy and compulsory educational laws, these cases are rare and
fact-specific, limiting the exception to those who have a long history of
insulated and isolated religious communities.8 5
As such, will the truancy and compulsory educational laws take
a back seat to the First Amendment in the context to a student expres-
sing their voice on a political issue such as immigration? Freedom of
speech is not absolute even though, as seen from O'Brien, political
speech is a paramount in our society.8 6 With this in mind, the inci-
dents that occurred in the spring of 2006 are analyzed below under the
test set forth in O'Brien. O'Brien is used to analyze whether the pro-
testing students had their constitutional rights violated when the
police issued truancy citations, and bussed schoolchildren back to
school while protesting immigration reform.
80. See supra Part II.
81. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
82. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Michigan v.
DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127.
83. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35 (holding that First and Fourteenth Amendment
prevented an Amish child being compelled to go to school under Wisconsin compulsory
education laws). The Yoder Court held that because the Amish have a rich history of being
a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society and as such one or two more
years of education could easily be met through vocational training of the Amish community.
See also Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (holding that compelling a student to only attend public
education unreasonably interfered with liberties of parents and guardians to determine
upbringing of their children); DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d at 140 (requiring state certificate to
teach violated free exercise clause as applied).
84. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35.
85. 78A C.J.S. Schools & School Districts at § 736.
86. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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1. Do Truancy Laws Further An Important Or
Substantial Government Interest?
States have a substantial state interest in requiring students to
attend school.8 7 The question that arises is how the state furthers its
objective of promoting citizenry of its youth while at the same time
quelling juvenile crime rates, another important state interest. In
O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that the government had a substan-
tial interest in raising and supporting a national army.8 It reasoned
that a system is needed to be in place for the mandatory registration of
individuals in order to support that army.8 9 Therefore, the draft sys-
tem furthered an important governmental interest.90 Here, the state
interests of enforcing truancy laws is to ensure children are in class so
they can become mature, well-rounded, productive citizens along with
a secondary interest in quelling daytime crime rates and ensuring that
young adults do not fall into a criminal pattern. 91
Requiring students to attend class is an obvious way to further
the first government interest. If a student is not in class he or she will
not have the privilege to be a part of the educational process. In dicta,
the Supreme Court stated that the "education of the young is only pos-
sible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote
themselves [to the teaching of the young]."92 As a result, to further the
state's interest in educating well-rounded, mature, productive citizens,
some sort of education needs to be provided. If a student is not in
school, they cannot receive that education. Therefore, by compelling
students to attend class the government furthers its interest.
The second government interest of quelling juvenile crime can
also be furthered using truancy and compulsory educational laws. "If a
[child is] not in school, they're going to be on the streets - and they're
going to learn all the wrong things."93 When the police have decided to
strictly enforce truancy laws by, for example, having "crack downs,"
dramatic results have followed. 94 In Minnesota, when police started
87. See supra Part II.
88. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (1944); see Delvin, supra note 36, at 704; First Step to a
Lifetime of Problems, supra note 36, at 1.
92. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
93. Alison Fee, Forbidding States from Providing Essential Social Services to Illegal
Immigrants: The Constitutionality of Recent Federal Action, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 93, 112
(1998).
94. Trujillo, supra note 40, at 73-74.
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enforcing truancy laws, daytime crime rate fell sixty-eight percent.95
With these dramatic results, it is clearly seen that by issuing truancy
violations the state has combated crime problems. As such, truancy
laws further the governmental state interests of ensuring that children
will be well-rounded productive citizens and of lowering crime rates.
2. Is the Government's Interest in Issuing Truancy
Violations Unrelated to the Suppression of
Free Speech of Schoolchildren?
In Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller the Federal Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit analyzed, by applying the O'Brien test,
whether the government's interest was unrelated to the suppression of
free speech by inquiring if the statute limited what was said, who could
say it, how much could be said and finally if the statute restricted the
speech at all.96 Truancy laws, as seen above, were premised to further
important state interests. 97 These statutes only regulate class attend-
ance. In no way do these statutes limit what can be said because they
do not address speech. This prong of the O'Brien analysis is met.
3. Is the Restriction No Greater than what is Essential
to the Furtherance of that State Interest?
Courts, in determining whether the state's action is no greater
than necessary, inquire into the legislature's ends and the means cho-
sen to accomplish those ends. In O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that
while the burning of a draft card is a way in which a person may pro-
test the war, there are alternatives available to a person who wishes to
protest the war that do not go against a substantial state interest.98
This fit does not need to be perfect but reasonable.99 To be reasonable,
the scope of the statute needs to be proportional to the interests that
are served. 0 0 Essentially, this means that the statute must be no
greater than is necessary to protect the government interest and leave
open ample communication alternatives.10 1 Here, the truancy laws
were created to serve the government's interest of promoting active cit-
95. Id. at 73.
96. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1253 (1997).
97. See supra Part II.
98. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.






izens and limiting criminal activity. However, the authorities did not
restrict the young adults' freedom of speech more than what was essen-
tial to that state interest. Therefore, their speech was not improperly
regulated by the state when they were compelled to return to school or
issued truancy violations.
While the other two prongs of O'Brien are easily met, the third
prong appears to be more problematic. Here, mostly high school stu-
dents were cited and compelled to return to school when they were
protesting immigration laws. The state's interests are outlined below
to determine if the truancy laws have been restricted no further than
necessary to serve its interest without violating the schoolchildren's
rights while still leaving ample opportunities to convey their message.
The first state interest, ensuring that the state educates youth
to become active, upstanding, well-rounded citizens, may seem to be at
odds with the incidents that occurred in spring 2006. Thomas Jeffer-
son once said that while education was a necessity in creating an
upstanding citizen, he limited his view to the belief that the state only
had an interest in the educating children in the basics of the "three
R's."10 2 Jefferson's emphasis on educating the young centered on
teaching schoolchildren the necessity of fighting against tyranny. 0 3
Here, these students believed strongly against the immigration laws
that were being brought in front of Congress. Since the students were
minors, they were unable to vote. The students, therefore, used the
only forum that they had. They took their voices to the streets and to
the pockets of the school districts.'-0 4 These students were not missing
days upon days of school or dropping out of school. They were voicing
their views on a single issue - immigration. If the state's interests
were truly to form minds that can act and participate in the democratic
process, would not quelling their voice be counterintuitive? If the state
truly wanted to teach the students about the democratic process, it will
need to recognize that students need to have the ability to raise their
voices and opinions.
However, this could lead to a slippery slope. School children
may simply latch onto hot topics. For this reason, an observer needs to
determine whether the statute excessively restricted speech in further-
ance of that state interest. The statutes must not be overly restrictive.
The interests of promoting welfare and building an upstanding citizen
cannot crush the rights of the young adults by restricting these young
102. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 n.14.
103. Id. at 225.
104. Police Enforce Truancy, supra note 7.
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adult's rights to free speech while not allowing for any alternatives.
Therefore, states, under O'Brien, need only protect a government inter-
est while leaving ample room to communicate ideas. 105 These
compulsory education laws do just this. These laws are designed to
ensure that students are in school during school hours.'0 6 The compul-
sory education laws do not extend to the home life of these young
adults. Generally, these compulsory education laws and truancy viola-
tions only affect a student's voice during school hours. Students can
practice their constitutional duties that they learned while in school
after school, while the state can further its interest of teaching these
students the "three R's" and citizenry. As such, compelling attendance
is no greater then necessary to further the first state interest.
While the second state interest of reducing daytime crime, juve-
nile crime, and vagrancy is a substantial state interest, which is
furthered by the statutes, and is unrelated to speech, the compulsory
education and truancy laws still cannot be excessively restrictive.
Here, the same analysis is used as above except here the state interest
in reducing crime may be more substantial. As a result, the state has
created statutes that are no greater than necessary to protect the gov-
ernment interest of preventing crime, while leaving open ample
alternatives for students to voice their opinion. The state in no way
has forbidden these students from protesting, marching, or generally
voicing their opinions outside of school hours. As such, there are alter-
natives for these students to raise their rights under the First
Amendment.
Generally, like O'Brien, there are alternatives for these young
adults to voice their opinion regarding the immigrations laws, such as
protesting before or after school or writing letters to their Congress-
men. The impact of not being in school may have been more dramatic
or may have influenced the school district financially; however these
affects are directly against well-established state interests. The state
has an interest in furthering those state interests especially when the
statutes, which were created to enforce these state interests, did not
trample on any one particular type of speech. While the students in
the wake of the police action in the spring of 2006 may have faced un-
fortunate consequences, these were a result of the state properly
enforcing its police powers. These young adult's First Amendment
rights have not been unconstitutionally restricted.
105. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-26 (2000); see generally O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
106. See supra Part II.
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IV. SUBSEQUENT SCHOOL CONSEQUENCES
While the state has an interest in compelling students to attend
school and has the right to issue truancy violations when students
break these compulsory education laws, this does not give carte
blanche to the schools to completely control and quell the student's
voice while they are attending school. This is clearly expressed in mon-
umental case of Tinker v. Des Moines: Independent Community School
District, where the Supreme Court stated "[it] can be hardly be argued
that .. .students . . .shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'10 7 While this right in
Tinker is not absolute, it is analyzed below to determine whether the
school districts had a right to subsequently punish students for the
events occurring in the spring of 2006 by suspending, issuing deten-
tions, or otherwise punishing these students for being truant. The
Tinker analysis is applied to this situation to show that the students
should not be subsequently punished by the schools for expressing
their voice.
First, it is important to revisit the facts surrounding the inci-
dents in the spring of 2006. The events arising in spring of 2006
centered on students either not attending schools or blatantly defying
school officials by getting up out of their seats and walking out of
class.108 In San Diego, California, the San Diego Unified School Dis-
trict suspended over one-hundred students involved in the student
protests. 0 9 Additionally, in nearby Oceanside Unified School District,
one-hundred-fifty students were suspended when they walked out of
school. 10 It is crucial to note that in both school districts, some stu-
dents, while walking off-campus, did participate in activities that
involved banging on classroom doors, throwing objects, and destroying
a schoolhouse gate in an attempt to leave campus."' These suspen-
sions are not unique to these school districts; they occurred in other
school districts as well." 2 Los Angeles Unified School District even
went so far as to call students at their homes warning students to at-
tend class or face consequences. 1 3 While the state's interest, as seen
above, is valid in compelling students to attend school, and while tru-
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
108. Saavedra, supra note 4; Police Enforce Truancy Laws, supra note 7.
109. Saavedra, supra note 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.; Hensley, supra note 4; Student Walkouts, supra note 4.
113. Adelman, supra note 4.
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ancy violations further this interest, the question now is whether
students should be punished by the schools after receiving truancy vio-
lations from the state in protesting the immigration reforms.
In Tinker, three students - a fifteen year old, a sixteen year old,
and a thirteen year old - were suspended for wearing black armbands
to school in protest of the Vietnam War. 114 The school, after deciding
days before to prohibit such conduct, suspended these students until
they removed the armbands. 115 The Supreme Court held that there
was no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct,
the act of wearing black armbands, would materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of the appropriate discipline in the
course of the operation of the school. 116 As such, the prohibition on the
wearing of armbands could not be sustained." 7 The Court reasoned
that schools could not be "enclaves of totalitarianism." 1 8 Therefore,
absent the showing of specific valid constitutional reasons to regulate
the speech, students are entitled to their views.11 9 This furthers the
nation's interest in exposing its future leaders to a wide array of intel-
lectual ideas.120 Therefore, the Court ruled that students may express
opinions, even on controversial topics, if they do so without materially
and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate
school discipline and the rights of other students.'
2 '
While some students simply skipped school, others walked out
of their classes. 122 While the students who skipped school altogether
were never on campus, the administrators believed that there was a
direct impact on the school day because the students deprived the
school of income and deprived other students of the opportunity of
their presence in class.' 23 As such, while the act of missing school did
not occur on campus, like the children wearing armbands in Tinker,
the analysis is still appropriate because it affected the school and the
school ultimately decided to punish these students subsequent to being
114. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 509.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 511.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 512.
121. Id. at 513; see also Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684
(1986) (holding that it is the appropriate function of the school to prohibit the use of vulgar
and lewd speech at school). The Supreme Court reasoned in Bethel that there is an interest
protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive language. Id.




issued truancy violations. Both groups of student protesters faced
school consequences.
Like Tinker, the specific content of the First Amendment speech
was at issue when the schools were punishing the students. 124 While
the state compulsory education and truancy laws were created and en-
forced regardless of the reason of the student for skipping school, the
school districts appear to be punishing these students based on the
content of the speech. 125 This is apparent because, in some schools, the
school called individual students to warn them if they did not attend
class that there were going to be consequences. 126 The school did not
call daily to inform students that playing hooky or simply skipping
school would result in consequences, rather the school called these stu-
dents when it knew that students might protest in opposition to the
proposed immigration laws. As a result, the situation arising out of
these events parallels that of what occurred in Tinker and therefore
the analysis in Tinker is appropriate.
The analysis of whether these students should be disciplined in
school for their behavior is centered directly on whether these students
substantially interfered in the operation of the school, and in doing so,
interfered with the rights of the other students in obtaining an educa-
tion. First in this analysis, it needs to be determined what exactly the
First Amendment speech at issue is. Here, two different types of
speech were used by the students, which are very similar. The first
was simply not going to school and the second was the act of attending
school and then the silent protest of getting up and leaving school. The
question turns to whether leaving school, or not attending school sub-
stantially interfered in the operation of school and interfered with
other student rights.
Here, the analysis comes to a fork in the road. This divergence
in the analysis occurs because the facts in each individual school differ.
At this point, it is important to analyze the facts on a case-by-case ba-
sis separating the students who got up and left their seats quietly as
compared to those students who may have been disruptive when get-
ting up out of their seats by yelling and pounding on doors. 127
The students who quietly arose up out of their seats and pro-
ceeded to leave the classroom had little affect on the operation of the
school or any disruptive effect on the students. There is no evidence
124. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (noting that school decided the day before to prohibit the
wearing of armbands).
125. See supra Part III.B.
126. Adelman, supra note 4.
127. See Saavedra, supra note 4.
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that any school operations were affected in a manner what so ever.
There is no showing that the schools stopped teaching the remaining
students or that there was any other affect on the proper administra-
tion of the schools. Additionally, while the students may have gotten
glances from other students who may have wondered what was going
on, and the teacher may have stopped class for a brief moment to ask
the student where he or she was going, this could not have materially
affected the rights of other students. This is further evidenced by look-
ing at Tinker. In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that the minor
disruptions of classes being briefly disturbed or other students chastis-
ing the students did not rise to the level being materially disruptive. 128
It was clear that the wearing of black armbands was a "silent, passive
expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder of disturbance
on the part [of the students] .-129 Therefore, the schools action in sus-
pending these students from expressing their opinion by walking out or
skipping school, absent any disturbance, was improper. These stu-
dents should not be further punished.
In comparison, the students that were engaging in disruptive
behavior such as banging on classroom doors, chatting, yelling, or any
other disruptive conduct were properly held to a different standard.
This is the exact freedom of speech that falls outside of the Tinker pro-
tection. These students, in leaving directly and materially, affected the
rights of other students to receive a quality education. Therefore, the
school has every right in punishing these students.
It is important to reiterate that students may express their
opinions while in school, even on controversial topics, if they do so
without materially and substantially interfering with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in operation of school and without
colliding with the rights of other students. 130 As seen above, this anal-
ysis is dependent on case-by-case analysis to determine whether in
leaving, the students materially affected the operation of school or the
rights of other students. The act of simply getting up and walking out
of class is a peaceful passive protest and as such, these students should
128. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 ("Any departure from absolute regimentation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. Bur our constitution says we
must take this risk." As such, "[in order for the State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness. .. ").




have the right to voice their beliefs without the fear of consequences of
the school. However, once the peaceful and passive conduct crosses
into the zone of interfering materially with other students, then the
school not only has the right to take action but also has the obligation.
V. CONCLUSION
Truancy laws and compulsory education laws are designed to
require young adults to attend school.' 3 ' The state enacted these stat-
utes in order to further a legitimate and substantial state interest.132
These state interests are to ensure that there is a continuance of well-
rounded, upstanding citizens 133 that can combat tyranny while at the
same time lower the amount of crime that is experienced in communi-
ties.134 While the state should promote youth to rise up and voice their
concerns about matters such as immigration, the state has a valid jus-
tification in quelling this voice during the hours in which students are
attending class. Therefore, the state acted properly in the issuing of
truancy citations, and it acted properly when it picked up students who
were protesting immigration laws and compelled them to return to
school. State compulsory education statutes are constitutional. How-
ever, students do not shed their First Amendment rights to free speech
at the schoolhouse gate. 135 If these students express their opinion in a
matter that is neither disruptive to the educational process nor inter-
feres with other students' rights, then these students cannot be
subsequently punished for walking out of classes and skipping classes
when voicing their first amendment right to free speech.' 36




135. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
136. Id. at 509.
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